Posted by Editor | Filed under Cada-Joe, Darvin Moon, Heads-Up, Live Reporting, Poker Strategy, WSOP 2009 Main Event, WSOP 2009 Main Event Final Table

The final table looked a lot different on TV than when I watched it live. For that matter, Joe Cada looked much different playing heads-up compared with how I saw him on ESPN on Tuesday night. Heads-up, he dominated Moon and seemed like a very savvy player. He was much less a focus of my attention on Saturday, especially because of the time he spent short-stacked. I didn’t see, didn’t notice, or didn’t keep track of all the times on Saturday when he got his chips in bad – but it seemed like always. On Monday he played like a stud. On Saturday more often than not, he looked like a dud.
But I followed his game much more closely on Monday especially because I wasn’t posting during heads-up. I was very impressed with Joe Cada’s play on Monday and, especially because of the contrast with his luckbox play on Saturday, I want you to have a full understanding of why I think this guy could be very good.
Joe had a very definite plan for playing heads-up and generally executed it well. Even when he lost his lead and was significantly behind Moon, he stuck with his strategy. Granted, there were some missteps and he can be a great player only if he regards his game as a work-in-progress. This is what I saw.
As I mentioned in post #910, Joe all but announced on the first hand (hand #277, according to pokernews.com, whose hand numbers I will use when describing the heads-up action) that he was almost always going to put Darvin Moon on a bluff. This was clearly the result of watching his play on Saturday. And Moon made Cada look like a genius because he didn’t alter his play a bit. I noted after hand #284, “I think Darvin is making a huge mistake. He’s trying to outplay Cada.”
Even though they had been playing less than fifteen minutes, the emerging pattern was of Moon calling Cada’s raises and trying to figure out how to get the pot later. Just three hands later (hand #287) Joe demonstrated how he could take advantage. Holding the Kd-9d in the big blind, Cada checked following Moon’s call and flopped the nut flush: Ad-10d-3d. He checked but Moon didn’t bite. Unable to get chips out of Moon by inducing a bluff, he followed the alternate strategy of betting for value. He bet the turn and river and got calls from Moon both times. In fact, on the river, Moon cut aside some raising chips before merely calling.
Even when Darvin Moon won pots and took the lead, it was consistent with Joe Cada’s plan. The second large pot won by Moon (the first was on their opening hand when Moon unknowingly bluffed with the better hand – which proves the old adage, “If you are going to make a number of mistakes, be sure it’s an EVEN number and maybe they’ll cancel each other out”) gave him the lead in the match on the next hand (hand #288). Joe raised to 2.5 million on his button with J-10 and Moon called with Q-8. After a flop of 6-5-J, Cada bet 3.5 million with top-pair. Moon then check-raised for 8.5 million – with nothing. Joe quickly called, as he usually did during hands in which he thought Moon was bluffing. Moon WAS bluffing. His Q-8 was nothing. He had no pair, no draw, and just one over card. But damned if he didn’t hit that queen on the turn. Moon checked the queen and so did Cada. After a deuce on the river, Moon bet 7.25 million and Cada quickly called.
Once again, he was certain Moon was bluffing and he was right. But the deck bailed Darvin out and he won the pot of nearly 40 million. It had to hurt Joe to lose the pot and the lead. But it vindicated Joe’s strategy and emphasized that the only way Darvin Moon could beat him was by making mistakes and getting lucky.
On hand #291 Joe made a very marginal value bet on the river and got paid because he knew that Darvin would call with anything. After Moon raised to 3 million and both players checked a board of Q-J-7-10, Cada bet 1.75 million after the river brought a 5 and Moon called. Joe showed a ten to take it with third-pair. Darvin turned over pocket eights, losing with fourth-pair.
On hand #293, Cada again punished Moon for letting himself get deep in to a hand against a skilled player. Moon raised to 3 million and Cada called. After a flop of Jc-4h-2d, Cada checked, Moon bet 4 million and Cada called. Cada checked again after the queen of hearts on the turn. Moon bet 6 million and Cada raised to 16.75 million.
The amount in the pot was growing so fast and so large that calling should be an option only if Moon was (a) trapping with a set, or (b) Daniel Negreanu or Ted Forrest and the usual rules of post-flop play don’t apply. Moon called the additional 10.75 million.
The river card was the five of clubs. Cada led out for 35 million. Moon immediately backed up his chair and mouthed “whew.” Darvin thought it over while counting his remaining chips.
What on earth was he thinking about? And what was he doing counting his chips NOW? He just called a raise of 10 million and the pot was 50 million. This was one of many instances where Moon clearly was not thinking through the entire hand, or even to the next card. In a fifty-million chip pot, he can’t count on his opponent checking the river or being able to call a small bet with a marginal hand. The time for ╥whew╙ was on the turn, when Darvin could have saved at least 10 million chips by realizing this was the worst time in the tournament to just call along with a marginal hand.
After the way hand #303 played out, Joe Cada’s victory seemed inevitable. Once again, Joe caught some of the flop, Moon later raised with nothing, Cada swallowed hard and called, and then the same thing repeated on the river. Moon raised to 2.5 million with Jh-5h and Cada called with Js-10h. Both players checked the flop of 10d-Ah-3h. I understand Joe not betting because Moon had position and raised, plus all he had was second pair and there was an Ace on the flop.
But why isn’t Moon betting? He raised so he is expected to bet. The Ace on the board gives him a chance to win the pot with a worse hand (though maybe he realizes by now that Joe will never believe him when he represents strength). In addition, he has his flush draw so there are multiple reasons for him to bet here. All he has really done is give Cada a basis for believing second-pair is good. Both players checked again after the 6c on the turn. After the 4s on the river, Joe bet 3 million. Darvin raised to 13 million.
Come on, it’s almost as if Moon has decided to make the OPPOSITE of the right play on every single street. I understand how he loves to bluff more than he loves to hunt but he could have done the same thing on the flop, when he could have thought he had the best hand, or a reasonable draw, or a credible bluff.
For me, this was another of those wish-I-could-play-poker-now moments. As Cada thought it over, I can imagine his thoughts mirroring mine. Could the river have helped Moon? Only if he had pocket sixes or 7-5. Could he be slow-playing and earlier set? Not likely, because Moon betting all the time is a great cover for getting paid all the time. Could Moon have an Ace? Almost impossible, because it’s hard to imagine trigger-happy Darvin raising, hitting his hand, and checking TWICE. Right around the time I figured that Cada must have had a 10, he called. His second-pair took down the huge pot. (I’m not even sure Cada induced that bluff. But he certainly recognized that, given the chance, Moon would hang himself.
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Tags: Heads-Up, Live Reporting, Poker Strategy, WSOP - 2009 - Main Event - Final Table - Heads-Up
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