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Everything gets exaggerated at the Final Table of the Main Event. It is such a unique spot that I am not even sure which rules SHOULD apply. But if you believe in the idea of turning down a reasonable opportunity for something better later, the Final Table of the Main Event would be such a situation.

But this is why I have trouble with the entire preservation theory. I recognize that it has a place, and that I may too often get my chips in with “correct” odds but cripple or bust myself in a tournament because it was a marginal situation. Merely believing in preservation isn’t enough for me theoretically. What are its limits? When do you throw away a good hand? When do you put all your chips at risk in an arguably marginal situation?

The problem with the people who advocate preservation is they haven’t been specific. It seems enough to say that you should fold an otherwise playable hand. And those people have an unfair advantage in the argument because (a) they assume better situations will arise later, which is unproven, as far as I know, and (b) they never bust on the hand they lay down, even if it is a terrible laydown, so the strategy automatically doesn’t look too bad on a one-hand-example basis.

Consequently, I think this poorly understood concept has been taken too far. I saw several examples of this during the Final Table of the Main Event in November.

The first obvious one involved Phil Ivey folding pocket jacks. He raised under the gun to 1.52 million (they were playing 250K-500K and he had over 16 million chips, his highest total at the Final Table). Antoine Saout re-raised on the button to 4 million. Thanks to TV, we know that Ivey had jacks and Saout had sevens. Phil folded his jacks, and did so pretty quickly.

See the problem here with preservation? You can justify any fold on that basis, and if Ivey had gone on to win the championship, this could conceivably have been used as a supporting reason rather than as a criticism. But how much better than the field is Phil Ivey? Not THAT much better. Howard Lederer, with whom I watched the initial broadcast, told me he was sick about this. He couldn’t believe that Phil would fold jacks in that situation.

I’m sure Ivey was thinking that he was being patient and finding opportunities. Guys didn’t want to play against him and with 30BBs, he could steal his way up with relatively little risk. Even though Phil Ivey was there and Howard Lederer was on the sidelines, I have to agree with Howard here. The idea that a player can get chips risk-free is vastly overstated. Yes, you can steal your way up, but that only works so much. At some point you have to be ready for confrontation.

In addition, it seems hard to believe that you can completely avoid coin flips and bad beats. Is anybody, even Phil Ivey, that good that he can throw away pocket jacks, a hand that is 60% to win even against top-10% hands? I have no trouble heaping almost endless praise on Phil, but the empirical evidence suggests he is not that good. He later called a shorter stack’s all-in with A-8 and lost a coin flip. Then he busted on a bad beat, losing with A-Q against A-K.

How would things have gone for Phil if he doubled up with those jacks? Maybe he wouldn’t take the race he knew he’d have when he called with A-8. Or he wouldn’t have been especially short when he lost that race. He probably could have escaped busting with A-K. With more chips, Ivey would have been happy to see a flop with Darvin Moon. Once the queen hit, Phil could have gotten away.

Phil Ivey was looking very strong at the time when he laid down the jacks. He was accumulating chips by getting people to fold and may have imagined he could continue doing that. But the fact that he later had to call against a smaller stack with A-8 and put all his chips at risk pre-flop suggests that even Phil Ivey has to take risks.

If Phil Ivey has to take risks, then everybody does. Jeff Shulman is an excellent big-tournament poker player but I think he succumbed to the same kind of mistake at the final table. He hired Phil Hellmuth – the guy who once thought he could throw away A-A preflop – as his coach so it’s not surprising that he was very conservative on the preservation issue. (One of the reasons Shulman picked Hellmuth was because of their similar approach to the game, and both were close, both socially and professionally, with Mike Matusow, who is also a big proponent of preservation at almost any cost. I described this in Part III of this series.) http://www.fulltiltpoker.com/poker-blog/2009/12/934-tournament-preservation-strategy-part-iii-phil-hellmuth-and-mike-matusow.php

Predictably, Schulman played few hands and made several laydowns .  As a result, he went from a medium stack to a relatively short stack. At 6:17pm, after the first two players at the Final Table had busted within the previous two hours, I had the following hand in my notes: “Shulman raised. Phil moved all-in, just under 7 million. Shulman’s thinking – Jeff thinks long and hard – dead silence – and folds.”

As we learned on TV, Jeff Shulman folded pocket nines. Phil Ivey had moved all-in with K-Q.  I learned about it even sooner than that. Jeff’s fold took place about a half hour before the dinner break. During the break, I received a call from Mike Matusow. I had spoken to him briefly during the earlier break about how he thought Ivey was playing. (“Phil’s playing perfect.”) We hadn’t spoken about Jeff but I think Mike called me because he wanted to talk about it with somebody.

“I’m sick. I can’t believe that hand against Ivey. Jeff laid down pocket nines. He had Ivey covered by 9 million chips and there’s no way Phil moves in with a hand better than pocket nines.”

It seems to me that if you have a coin flip to bust Phil Ivey from the Final Table of the Main Event, you have to take it. This seems especially true when you are relatively short on chips but have more than double Phil’s stack. That Mike Matusow, who is at the far end on the issue of laying down big hands, would agree suggests to me this isn’t even a particularly close question.

James Akenhead started the Final Table with the shortest stack. Especially because the payouts among the first several players eliminated did not increase substantially, there was relatively little reason for him to play conservatively or lay down hands. But he did, repeatedly. And some of the hands on which he got in his chips may not have been better than the ones he laid down.

On the very first hand he played, he raised with nearly 15% of his stack. When Darvin Moon, in the big blind made a small re-raise, James folded. Akenhead had enough chips to make the fold but why try to steal your way up if you are going to fold to the amateur with the big stack in the big blind?  (It’s possible that Moon entered the Final Table with a reputation of re-raising only with strong hands; he certainly didn’t have that reputation by the end of the day.)

James eventually got all his chips in with K-Q but ran into A-K. He tripled up, however, with a queen on the river. He later lost most of those chips, though, when his kings ran into aces.

Once again the short stack, he made another questionable lay down. In the small blind with 5.9 million, James raised Ivey’s big blind to 1.2 million. Phil had James covered about 2-to-1 and moved all-in, meaning it was 4.7 million for James to call. Akenhead could have doubled up and crippled Phil Ivey but instead folded. He refused to pay 4.7 million to win a pot that would have been worth over 12 million.

I probably don’t put enough emphasis on preservation but it seemed like an easy call. (I’m discounting him picking up a read on Ivey or figuring that, because he was priced in to call, Phil could not possibly put so many chips at risk preflop without a super-strong hand.)

Somehow, something was wrong with Akenhead’s strategy. He either had to move all-in or fold, or be willing to take a chance. Who knows what he folded to Ivey here, but unless you can assume Phil is going to play ONLY big pocket pairs in that situation, James is getting pretty good odds to call and roll the dice. As it was, the fold made him so short-stacked that he had to move in just a few hands later with pocket threes. His emphasis on preservation didn’t keep him from losing with pocket kings, getting it in with the worst of it, or busting in ninth place.

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4 Responses to “#936 – Tournament Preservation Strategy, Part V – 2009 World Series Final Table”

1. Johnyb Good Says:
   December 25th, 2009 at 7:16 am

   Preservation Again ? …. oh well more and more huh ?
   I think to much emphasis is being placed on preservation. There is always going to be a element of risk. At any final table, let alone any WSOP final table. More talk should be placed on “good poker”… Or as i refer to “you think you got me”. Eat this…. as your being fed something ” I want you to eat”… as i then then ‘hit you with another twist”…. within a twist…. follow me ?
   This is where the most emphasis should be placed…. something to always remember “aggression is almost always the right answer”,

2. mad1 Says:
   December 26th, 2009 at 8:07 pm

   Michael – you make a great case against Phil Ivey’s laydown of pocket jacks. I was surprised to see it as well. But as a strategy, I don’t know that his was necessarily wrong; that was a very tight laydown, but in general how can the theory of preservation at the final table be refuted as incorrect? At that level (the final table) – each place meant significantly more money, if money was an issue to anyone. Of course, for Ivey, that likely wasn’t the biggest factor. But also – the pressure could have been on any or all of them. Ivey may have, in retrospect, regretted his play on that hand, and he may actually have made a mistake on that particular hand. The odds say he did, and certainly his read was not correct. But he may not have regretted his overall play or strategy. He must have done something (many things) correct to have made it that far. He was certainly the big favorite in the hand when he was knocked out with A-K vs. A-Q. So in theory, he waited and had the better hand, but lost with the best of it. He did wait, and did get a favorable situation (no, not better than the JJ hand) – but still he was in a fine spot and just had his better hand cracked.

   Again, this is a strong argument for Ivey misplaying his hand, but overall – that approach, his preservation, only served to get him knocked out when he had the best of it. But all in all, the idea of waiting for great hands is certainly not the way to make it far in any tournamnet. It still comes down to timing and reading opponents…

3. Ratsan 1941 Says:
   January 2nd, 2010 at 2:16 pm

   Michael,
   Good discussion of preservation as a multiplier/divider of the more settled poker strategies. When Phil Ivey or Joe Schmoe lay down a hand, it is almost always because they don’t have confidence that their hand will prevail (Hellmuth/Matusow two aces before the flop). Is one to be more or less confident in a hand depending on whether it is early or late in the tournament? Same argument for big stack/small stack. I believe Joe S is more likely to lay down a big hand if Phil is the raiser than Phil is (unless Joe is Darvin!!??).

   All this to say it looks more like “Art” than “Science.” And you can teach someone to paint, but that doesn’t make them an artist. Preservation to one extent or another is what brought each champion to the final table and the bracelet (except, of course, Jamie Gold).

4. mike Says:
   May 19th, 2010 at 5:18 am

   I think Ivey laying down the Jacks was terrible, and I was sick watching it when he did. I think if he wins that hand he is gonna take the tourney because it alters everything else
   that happend including cada taking more chances.

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